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From relative obscurity criminal procedure in recent years has
been elevated by the United States Supreme Court to the status
of a major national issue, debated not only within the sanctuary
of the courtroom but also within the halls of Congress and from
the pulpit and editorial pages, as well as upon the street corners
of America. No longer are the rights and privileges set forth in
the Bill of Rights of interest solely to students of American con-
stitutional history. Now "unreasonable search and seizure",
"probable cause", "double jeopardy", "self-incrimination", "due
process", "right to a speedy and public trial", "right to confront-
ation", "right to counsel", and "right of trial by jury" have be-
come familiar terms in the jargon of judges, counsel and police.
Procedural errors of a constitutional nature account for a large
majority of the prosecutions dismissed, reversed or remanded.
Accordingly, this survey will focus exclusively upon develop-
ments in criminal procedure. Necessarily extensive treatment
will be given to decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
while South Carolina and lower federal decisions will be eval-
uated in relation to guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court.
This survey will also give extensive treatment to major legisla-
tion enacted in South Carolina.
I. GumTY PTF
While the simple entry of a guilty plea lacks the dramatic
flavor of a courtroom trial, such pleas account for the over-
whelming majority-most estimates are in the 85% - 90%
range -of convictions obtained in the United States. Until re-
cent years the courts paid scant attention to the guilty plea pro-
cess. Instead they centered their interest upon safeguarding the
rights and privileges of the defendant during the pre-trial cus-
todial and investigatory periods or during the actual trial. In-
creasingly, however, the guilty plea process has come under fire
from many legal writers, with the brunt of criticism falling on
the plea bargaining process. Yet most responsible writers con-
tinue to recognize that the guilty plea is an essential element in
the present framework of criminal administration, marked by too
little courtroom space and too few personnel to handle the flood
1
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of criminal trials which even a moderate reduction in guilty pleas
would entail. The courts have focused on the actual entry of the
plea in order to determine whether the defendant was aware of
the nature and consequences of his plea before entering it volun-
tarily.
In Boykin v. A bavO the United States Supreme Court
found reversible error where the trial record did not affirmative-
ly disclose that the defendant had voluntarily and understand-
ingly pleaded guilty. The defendant pleaded guilty to five
counts of armed robbery and was sentenced by a jury to death. He
was represented by counsel at the arraignment, but the trial rec-
ord failed to reveal whether the presiding judge had examined
him as to the circumstances under which he entered his plea. Af-
firmative judicial inquiry is required, and must be fully shown
in the record.2
In Dixon v. State8 the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled
that, at least in cases where the defendant is not represented by
counsel when he enters his plea, the trial judge must conduct more
than a perfunctory examination into the validity of the plea.
Dixon was represented by counsel during the pre-trial period fol-
lowing his arrest and was advised to plead guilty; however, his
counsel was not present when he entered his plea. While recog-
nizing the defendant's right to have the assistance of counsel at
the arraignment, the court found that Dixon had validly waived
this right.
But because of the complexity of the charges, the court held
that the trial judge was obligated to conduct a more thorough
inquiry into the defendant's understanding of the consequences
of his plea than whether he knew the maximum sentence for the
crimes with which he was charged and whether he understood the
nature of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. Dixon,
who pleaded guilty to escape, assault with intent to kill and mur-
der, and grand larcency, was entitled to a more precise explana-
1. 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969).
2. While it is the practice for South Carolina trial judges to conduct an
inquiry into the validity of a guilty plea so that Boykin will have little practical
impact in this state, this decision does invalidate Thompson v. State, 248 S.C.
475, 151 S.E.2d 221 (1966), where the court found no reversible error where
the trial court had failed to inquire into the voluntariness of the plea and
admonish the defendant as to the consequences of his plea, apparently on the
theory that since the defendant was represented by able counsel he must have
been informed of the consequences.
3. 168 S.E.2d 770 (S.C. 1969).
2
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tion of the charges in order to determine intelligently whether
his admitted conduct warranted pleading guilty to all the
charges.4 Similarly the court should properly have ascertained
whether the defendant was aware of any rights or consequences
inuring to him under Section 17-553.2 of the South Carolina
Code.5
A guilty plea gained through coercion, deception, or fraud is
clearly a violation of due process, but what constitutes coercion,
deception, or fraud is often difficult to determine. In Townes v.
Peyton8 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted
with the issue of whether a Negro defendant's beliefs, that there
was a general pattern of racial discrimination in jury selection
procedure7 and that Negroes accused of raping white females in-
variably received the death penalty from such juries, were suf-
ficient grounds to constitute a valid claim that his guilty plea
was induced through mental coercion. A statistical analysis con-
ducted by the court did not verify the defendant's beliefs. The
court ruled that there must be a showing not only that the plea
was induced by a fear of the consequences of an unconstitutional
policy or practice but also that the fear was grounded in fact.
II. SEARCH AND SEz RE; ARREST
Judicial interpretation of the fourth amendment has necessari-
ly centered upon the closely related phrases, "unreasonable
searches and seizures," and "no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause ... ." Behind the enactment of the fourth amend-
ment was a period of American colonial history which had wit-
nessed the frequent employment of warrantless searches and of
searches conducted pursuant to a general warrant by British of-
ficials. Although all such searches and seizures were not intended
to be prohibited, there existed a strong constitutional preference
for search warrants and, to a lesser extent, for arrest warrants.
4. For example, the trial court properly should have determined whether
Dixon's understanding of the act he had committed warranted and supported
a plea of assault with intent to kill and murder, rather than some lesser degree
of assault
S. This section must be read in conjunction with § 17-553.1, which provides
for the sentencing of repeated offenders. § 17-5532 provides that any number
of offenses, even though they might be separate and distinct, will be considered
as one offense for purposes of imposing sentence pursuant to § 17-553.1, where
the offenses are committed in temporal proximity. This section could be
applicable to Dixon, for the defendant committed the three crimes with which
he was accused in one night while engaged in a jailbreak.
6. 404 F2d 456 (4th Cir. 1968).
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While there are certain narrowly defined situations8 where war-
rantless searches will be permitted, the courts have consistently
ruled that in the absence of some "grave emergency," a search
will be deemed "unreasonable" if it is executed without a war-
rant.0
In United States v. Rabinowitz ° the Court upheld a thorough
search without a warrant of the defendant's one room office,
under the theory that the police might search "the place" where
an arrest was made so long as the scope of the search was "rea-
sonable." In its wake came a flood of state court decisions which
construed the Rabinowitz holding so liberally that the constitu-
tional preference for a warrant was frequently evaded.
Rabinowitz came to stand for the bizarre proposition that the
police could validly conduct a warrantless search of the defend-
ant's entire house incident to a lawful arrest as long as he was
arrested within the house, while a search of a house incident to
an arrest outside the house was "unreasonable.""
The Court has retreated from Rablnowitz by recognizing the
fact that police all too frequently were employing an arrest at
the defendant's home as a pretense for conducting sweeping war-
rantless searches. In Von Cleef v. New JerSey12 it ruled that a
warrantless search of a sixteen room house made incident to a
lawful arrest was invalid even under the standard enunciated in
Rabinowitz. The Court in Ckime v. Calif onia'3 sought to define
narrow and specific bounds within which police could legitimate-
ly conduct warrantless searches incident to an arrest and to there-
by restore the strong constitutional preferences for search war-
rants. In Chitmel the Court was unwilling to couch its decision in
terms of Rabinowitz as it had done in Von Cleef and Shipley v.
California.14 The decision limits the scope of a warrantless search
incident to an arrest to the area under the immediate control of
8. Most courts will uphold warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles,
of premises with the owner's consent, of premises incident to a lawful arrest,
or of objects in plain view.
9. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
10. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
11. In State v. Porter, 251 S.C. 393, 162 S.E.2d 843 (1968), the South
Carolina Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of the defendant's entire
house, including the basement; but in Shipley v. California, 89 S.Ct. 2053
(1969), the police, apparently overeager after awaiting the defendant's arrival
for several hours, arrested him in the driveway outside his home and the
Court invalidated the subsequent search of the home.
12. 89 S.Ct. 2051 (1969).
13. 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969).
14. 89 S.Ct. 2053 (1969).
[Vol. 21
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the accused, this being the area in which the defendant could ob-
tain a weapon or destructible evidence. Apparently an area be-
yond an arm's-length of the defendant would be off limits.
In State v. Daniels:5 the South Carolina Supreme Court up-
held a seizure without a search warrant of objects lying in the
backseat of an automobile. While the issue could probably have
been dismissed on the relatively simple ground that the defend-
ant lacked standing to challenge the "search," the court elected
to proceed upon the more difficult theory that since the seized
evidence was in plain view the police conduct did not constitute
a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The ac-
cused and a companion were stopped for a traffic violation, and
since neither had a driver's license, the car was impounded on a
city street. Upon learning of a robbery, the police suspected
Daniels and his friend and returned to the car, easily observing
the implements of the crime from outside the car.16 The case was
decided on the theory that as long as the criminal object may be
seen by the police, who are rightfully in the position from which
they view it, there is no need for a search warrant to seize the
evidence.
In his appeal Daniels raised a second issue, arguing that his
right to a fair trial had been denied in that the state had intro-
duced into evidence scrap paper taken without a search warrant
from a courthouse office provided for the defendant's use during
the trial. The gist of these notes was that the defendant was en-
couraging several of his witnesses to perjure themselves. The
court upheld the use of these notes on the ground that the jury
in assessing the credibility of the defendant and his witnesses
was entitled to know what took place between them while they
were in the office.
This reasoning, as well as the result, appear fallacious in light
of recent Supreme Court decisions. In Katz v. United States7
the Court declared that the fourth amendment's protection against
unreasonable search and seizure was designed to protect people
and not areas.' s In Katz the Court invalidated the introduction of
15. 167 S.E.2d 621 (S.C. 1969).
16. See also Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. Here the Court was rejecting the contention that there are certain
"constitutionally protected areas" such as the home or office and that when a
person is outside of one of these areas he can no longer expect to be protected
from warrantless or unreasonable searches and seizures. In arguing that the
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evidence obtained by the FBI, without a warrant, where they had
bugged a public telephone booth. To the Government's conten-
tion that there was no search in the constitutional sense because
the booth was public and was constructed largely of glass so that
the defendant could be easily observed, the Court replied that by
paying to place a call Katz was seeking to exclude the "univited
ear" and not the "intruding eye"; he had the right to expect that
his constitutional privilege against unreasonable search and sei-
zure would not be violated by a government agent's "seizing" his
conversation with electronic devices.
A strong argument can be made that Katz is applicable to
DanieZs. By providing the defendant with an office for con-
ferences during the trial, the State obviously recognized his need
for privacy. Although the office was within the suite used by
the solicitor and was frequented by him and his staff while the
defendant was not using it, there is a strong argument that
Daniels had a right to believe that his conferences with his at-
torney and his witnesses were to be private. The invasion of this
right would have been more obvious had the State employed
electronic eavesdropping devices to overhear the conversation,
but by searching the trashbasket the prosecution nevertheless in-
fringed the right to expect that the conferences were to be pri-
vate.
19
an area accessible to the public or segments of the public he may rightfully
expect that some of his activities which he seeks to preserve as private will be
constitutionally protected.
19. The use of this evidence arguably could have violated Daniel's sixth
amendment right to counsel in that an essential ingredient of this right is
preparation of the defense without intrusion by the State. In Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), the Court strongly indicated without deciding that
it would consider such intrusion in the form of an electronic eavesdropping
device (or an informer) planted in the defendant's camp as a violation of the
sixth amendment. However, this argument would be less applicable in Daniels
since his counsel was not present during the conferences in which the scrap
paper was produced. Quaere: Might not such an intrusion upon a conference
between the defendant and his witnesses constitute a violation of the defendant's
right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his behalf? The
essence of this right is the defendant's opportunity to have witnesses favorable
to his case appear, and such a right would be seriously infringed upon if his
conferences with his witnesses were subject to eavesdropping.
It would also appear that defense counsel's contention that the defendant
was denied a fair trial was dismissed too lightly. Certainly the use of such
evidence constitutes a breach of faith between the defendant and the prosecutor,
and it could be argued that thereby the defendant was denied due process of
law. In cases like Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Court has
adopted the position that where the State's conduct was such as "to offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
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Before a search or an arrest can be made, either with or with-
out a warrant, there must exist probable cause to justify the in-
trusion upon the individual's privacy. Judicial methodology in
determining probable cause is well illustrated in Spinelli v.
United States.20 The FBI had obtained a search warrant for
bookmaking devices based on information that its agents had ob-
served Spinelli on numerous occasions travelling from Illinois to
an apartment in St. Louis, that the apartment had two tele-
phones, that Spinelli was "known" as a bookmaker, and that the
FBI had been informed by a "reliable informant" that Spinelli
was accepting bets on the two telephones in the apartment. The
Court held the search invalid because the information provided
did not suffice to establish probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant. The first two statements reflected only innocent-
appearing activity and would not alone provide grounds for the
issuance of a search warrant; the assertion that Spinelli was
"known" as a bookmaker without stating any basis for such a be-
lief was without probative value. The decision hinged upon the
issue of whether the informant's tip, taken alone or in connection
with the other information was sufficient to establish probable
cause. The Court offered two grounds why such information was
insufficient. The information did not provide enough detail for
a magistrate to determine why the police thought the informer to
be reliable and it did not set forth the circumstances underlying
the informant's beliefs so that the magistrate could make an in-
dependent adjudication of the existence of probable cause.
21
In Davis v. Mississippi22 the Court reaffirmed the position
taken in Terry v. Ohio23 that the fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable "seizures" of the person is not limited to
formal arrests but is also applicable to "investigatory detentions."
In Davis, the police, acting upon an elderly rape victim's rather
unenlightening description of her assailant as a Negro youth,
brought in twenty-four Negro youths, including the defendant,
for fingerprinting. Even the police conceded that there was no
probable cause to believe the defendant to be connected with the
20. 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969).
21. See also Recznik v. Lorain, 89 S.Ct. 342 (1968), where the Court ruled
that the police did not have probable cause where, acting upon information
supplied by unidentified citizens who told of gambling activities at the defend-
ant's residence, the police went there but saw nothing more than a large
number of cars parked outside.
22. 89 S.Ct. 1394 (1969).
23. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry the Court held that the fourth amendment
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crime at the time he was brought in. The Court rejected the
State's arguments that since the defendant's detention occurred
during the investigatory rather than the accusatory stage of the
process there was not a seizure within the context of the fourth
amendment requiring probable cause. It held that the finger-
prints taken during this period of detention were the product of
an illegal arrest and were improperly admitted into evidence.
III. Comssiows
Miranda v. Arizona24 eliminated the need for a judicial inquiry
into the totality of circumstances surrounding a confession in
order to determine its voluntary nature. The celebrated Miranda
warnings must be given only when the defendant is in "custodial
interrogation," and the spontaneous or threshhold confession is
not within the ambit of Miranda. A prime judicial battlefield
has been whether a confession made by a criminal defendant
while unadvised of his rights was elicited while he was in "cus-
todial interrogation." In Orozco v. Texas25 the defendant was
awakened in the early morning by the police, who strongly sus-
pected his involvement in a homicide the previous night. The
defendant was briefly questioned in his own bedroom without
being advised of his rights. With little hesitation he admitted
his guilt and told the officers where his pistol was hidden. Since
the defendant was not free to leave while being questioned by
the police, the Court held that the Miranda warnings should have
been given; the warnings are required whenever a person being
interrogated is deprived of his freedom of movement to any
significant extent. The Court's majority rejected the contention
vigorously and persuasively urged by the minority that Miranda
was applicable primarily to incommunicado interrogation of in-
dividuals in a police-dominated atmosphere and that Miranda
was inapplicable to the Orozco-type situation where the defend-
ant was at his home and was not subjected to physical or mental
coercion by the police.
In State v. Redding26 the defendant was routinely frisked be-
fore being placed in a cell after his arrest. The frisk resulted in
24. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Under Miranda the police, before questioning a
criminal defendant who has been taken into custody, must advise the accused
of his right to counsel, that the State will provide him counsel if he cannot
afford a lawyer, that he may remain silent, and that any statement made by
him may be used against him.
25. 89 S.Ct. 1095 (1969).
26. 166 S.E2d 219 (S.C. 1969).
[Vol. 21
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the discovery of a wallet belonging to the victim of the assault.
The defendant spontaneously exclaimed, "That is not mine. I
found it on the school bus." The court found no error in the in-
troduction of this statement, for while the defendant was in cus-
tody at the time he made the statement he had not been interro-
gated. The court approvingly cited Miranda:
The fundamental import of the privilege while an in-
dividual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to
talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and
counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no
requirement that police stop a person who enters a police
station and states he wishes to confess .... ,127
IV. Lnx-Up
In United States v. Tade2 8 the Court held that the eyewitness
identification of a defendant, adduced at a line-up could not be
used at the trial unless the defendant was represented by counsel
at the line-up, or had validly waived his right. In Wade the
Court recognized the line-up as a critical stage in the criminal
process, where serious miscarriages of justice could occur unless
counsel were present to see that improper or unduly suggestive
procedures were not employed. The Wade decision was not ap-
plied retroactively, however, 29 and a significant number of cases
are still arising before appellate courts which must determine the
validity of line-up identification under the pre-Wade stand-
ards.30 It was for the jury3 l to determine whether the line-up
was unfairly suggestive.
In Foster v. CaZiforni 8 2 the defendant was placed in a line-up
with two much shorter men, but the victim was unable to make a
positive identification. He was then put into a one-on-one con-
frontation with the victim, who still was unable to identify him.
Finally he was placed in a second line-up, in which he was the
only individual to have appeared in both; in this second line-up
27. Id. at 224, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
28. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
29. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
30. These standards, of course, are still applicable when counsel is present
but it is expected that the issue will not arise as frequently since counsel
presumably will insist that the police conduct the line-up in a manner non-
violative of the defendant's rights under due process.
31. In some cases, of course, the line-up procedure is so flagrantly defective
as to make the identification constitutionally inadmissible as a matter of law.
Foster v. California, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1128 n2 (1969).
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the victim saw the light and identified the defendant as the cul-
prit. The Court held that this procedure was so conducive to mis-
taken identification as to be a denial of due process.
In the South Carolina case of State v. Lyons s the defendant,
unrepresented by counsel, was placed in a line-up with three much
taller men. The robbery victim identified him and repeated her
identification in court.8 4 In order to show the inherent unfair-
ness of this line-up and the subsequent identifications, Lyons'
counsel conducted a demonstrative line-up in the courtroom using
the same persons as were in the prior line-up. In refusing to re-
verse the conviction the court stated that the question of whether
the original line-up was improperly conducted and whether the
subsequent courtroom identification was dependent upon the prior
identification at the line-up were factual questions for the jury.
Where the court had properly instructed the jury on these issues,
the supreme court would not upset its findings of fact.
V. Doui3LE JEoPARDY
In Benton v Maryland35 the Court held that the double jeopar-
dy clause of the fourth amendment was applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Thus sounded the death
knell of Pa ko v. Connecticut. 6 In Benton the defendant was in-
dicted for burglary and larceny; a jury convicted him on the
burglary count but acquitted him on the larceny charge. He suc-
cessfully appealed his conviction on the burglary charge, and the
Maryland Supreme Court ordered a new trial because of an un-
constitutional jury selection procedure. The state reindicted Ben-
ton on both counts, and he was subsequently convicted of both.
The Court held that this practice was unconstitutional as a viola-
33. 154 S.E.2d 445 (S.C. 1968).
34. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court ruled that an
in-court identification could not be admitted into evidence unless it was clear
that this identification was not tainted by a prior identification at a line-up
in which the defendant was unrepresented by counsel.
35. 89 S.Ct. 2056 (1969).
36. 302 U.S. 319 C 1937). In Palko the Court ruled that the fifth amend-
ment protection against double jeopardy would not be applied per se to the
states; the Court -would grant the petitioner relief only if the state procedure
violated rights "inherent in the concept of ordered liberty." In the three decades
between Palko and Benton the Court had increasingly approached rejection
of this position. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) ; Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
[Vol. 21
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tion of the double jeopardy clause.3 7 In Green v. United States3"
the Court, upon being presented with the same fact situation, had
reasoned that "conditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced
surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense
exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar
against double jeopardy."3 9
In NortA Carolira v. Peare40 the Court treated another aspect
of the double jeopardy problem -multiple punishments for the
same offense. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to ten
years. After serving two and one-half years he successfully over-
turned his conviction and was granted a new trial; he was con-
victed again and sentenced to twenty-five years without being
given credit for the time already spent in the penitentiary. The
Court held that the defendant's right against being placed in
double jeopardy was violated by the failure to give him the two
and one-half years credit.41
VI. RinT To A Spnay TnuL
In Klopfer v. North CarolinO42 the Court held that the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial was applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. In Smith v. Hooey43 the
Court sought to determine the extent of the state's obligation to
provide an accused a public trial. The defendant was serving
time in a federal prison while there were outstanding charges
against him in Texas. He frequently petitioned the state to try
him on the charges, but the state took no steps to secure his pres-
ence, apparently on the theory that since the defendant was ser-
ving time in another jurisdiction there was no duty to proceed
37. Beiton will have an impact on South Carolina practice. This state
has followed the rule that where a defendant successfully appealed his con-
viction on one count of an indictment, he waived the right to avail himself of
an acquittal on the second count of the same indictment. He could thus be
reindicted and tried on both counts at a new trial. State v. Steadman, 216
S.C. 579, 59 S.E.2d 168 (1950).
38. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
39. Id. at 227.
40. 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969).
41. While this case does not present a case of multiple punishments for the
same offense as usually defined, imagine the situation where the maximum
sentence for an offense is ten years. The defendant might then serve three
years, successfully appeal and gain a new trial, be reconvicted and sentenced to
serve ten years without being given credit for the three already served. Thus
he would serve thirteen years for an offense whose maximum punishment
is ten years.
42. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
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with the charges against him.44 The Court held that Texas had a
constitutional duty to make a diligent, good faith effort to bring




In State v. Harper" the South Carolina Supreme Court, in ac-
cordance with United States v. Jackson,4 7 held that S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-553.4 (Supp. 1968) which provided that those pleading
guilty to capital offenses would be sentenced as though a jury had
returned a guilty verdict with a recommendation to the mercy of
the court, was unconstitutional. The effect of this statute un-
doubtedly was to encourage those accused of a capital offense to
plead guilty since by doing so the death penalty would be au-
tomatically avoided; alternatively, by pleading not guilty, the de-
fendant took the risk that a jury would convict him without re-
commending mercy and the death penalty would be imposed.48
Following the reasoning set forth in Jackson, the Harper court
maintained that Section 17-553.4 operated to discourage the de-
fendant's assertion of his sixth amendment right to a jury trial
and his fifth amendment right to plead not guilty and that it was
therefore unconstitutional.
While Harper has the legal effect of preserving inviolate the
right to a jury trial by equalizing the risk of the death penalty
for pleas of guilty and of not guilty, it has led to a confusion
among the South Carolina courts as to how the guilty plea in a
capital case should be handled. Apparently some counties will
adopt special sentencing juries to impose sentence upon the de-
fendant with the prosecutor and defense counsel urging the jury
to recommend mercy. In other counties, the solicitors are adopt-
ing the practice used before it was possible to plead guilty to a
capital offense. The defendant initially enters a plea of not
44. It is customary for federal prison officials to allow prisoners to be
tried on outstanding state charges if the state requests their presence for trial.
45. There is a division among the jurisdictions as to the effect of a dis-
charge of a prisoner on the ground that the right to a speedy trial has been
violated. Some states have taken the position that such a discharge would bar
a second prosecution on the same or a new indictment on the theory that any
other construction would make for a complete evasion of the purpose underlying
this provision. Other jurisdictions hold that a discharge would not bar a
second prosecution but would merely operate to free the defendant from further
imprisonment while awaiting trial. The Supreme Court has not initimated its
position on this problem. See 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 256 (1965).
46. 251 S.C. 379, 162 S.E.2d 712 (1968).
47. 88 S.Ct. 1209 (1968).
48. See S.C. CoDE Axx. § 16-52 (1962).
12
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guilty and then after the jury is empanelled he withdraws his
plea, whereupon the solicitor submits the case to the jury with
the request that it return a guilty verdict with a recommendation
to the mercy of the court. While decisions such as Harper and
Jackson have been hailed by those opposing capital punishment
as a significant step toward its eventual abolition, in South Caro-
lina one question remains unanswered: What happens if the sen-
tencing jury under either procedure outlined above fails to re-
turn a verdict with a recommendation to the mercy of the court?
Theoretically the trial judge would be bound to impose the death
penalty; however, this result might be obviated by the trial judge
declaring a mistrial.49
VIII. RIGHT or CoNRoNTATION
The right to confront one's accusers, guaranteed by the sixth
amendment and made applicable to the states via the fourteenth
in Pointer v. Texas, 50 has become an active source of constitu-
tional litigation. The issue can arise in many forms, but in what-
ever context it arises the courts insist that the jury have an ade-
quate opportunity to assess the credibility of those accusing the
defendant and that the defendant be able to cross-examine his ac-
cusers.
In Havrington v. Californial5 the Court considered a problem
that it had first treated in Bruton v. United States.5 2 In both
cases a co-defendant's confession, highly damaging to the defend-
ant, was introduced into evidence against the co-defendant; the
defendant was unable to cross-examine the co-defendant, who re-
fused to take the witness stand. In Bruton the Court held that
the use of such a confession, even when the trial judge cautions
the jury to consider it only against the confessor, violated the de-
fendant's right of confrontation where the confessor did not testi-
fy. The confession of a co-defendant is highly damaging to the
other defendant, and it is asking too much of a jury to disregard
the confession when considering the guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant. In Harrington the Court was confronted with the same
situation but refused to vitiate the defendant's conviction on the
49. See Comment, Death Penalty Statutes-Guilty Pleas - Sentencing by
the Jury, 20 S.C.L. Rv. 841 (1968).
50. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
51. 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969).
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grounds that the introduction of the confession was harmless
error within the rule enunciated in Chapmanv . California.
53
In Frazier v. Cupp,154 the Court considered a factual situation
quite similar to that presented in Bruton and Htarrington. In its
opening statements to the jury the prosecution outlined the ex-
pected testimony that one of two co-defendants would likely give;
however, the co-defendant subsequently refused to testify.5 Mo-
tion for a mistrial, made by the other defendant's counsel at the
close of the statement and after the co-defendant refused to testi-
fy, were denied; the court charged the jury not to consider the
remarks made in the opening statement. In holding that these
statements did not constitute a violation of the defendant's right
of confrontation, the Court reasoned that the limiting instruc-
tions were sufficient to protect the defendant's rights. Bruton
was distinguished on the ground that "the jury was not being
asked to perform the mental gymnastics of considering an in-
criminating statement against only one of two defendants in a
joint trial.""( The Court found the statement to be only an ob-
jective summary of expected testimony, not touted to the jury as
being a vital cog in the prosecution's case. The Court was unwill-
ing to accept the defendant's argument that the jury would be so
influenced by these remarks that they could not appraise the evi-
dence objectively even after being properly charged not to con-
sider the remarks.
In Berger v. CaZiforna57 the Court was confronted with
another aspect of the right-of-confrontation problem. The Court
gave a strong indication of the importance with which it regards
this right by holding that its ruling in Barber v. Page5 s should
be applied retroactively.5 9 In both cases the State introduced
53. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapmant the Court held that where the de-
fendant's constitutional rights were violated, the use of the fruits of such a
violation "must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" with the burden upon
the state to prove the error to be harmless. Harrington is one of the rare
cases in which the Court has found harmless error; it deemed the other evi-
dence of the defendant's guilt to be overwhelming and the confession to be
only cumulative to other persuasive evidence presented.
54. 89 S.Ct. 1420 (1969).
55. The prosecutor had every reason to believe that the defendant would
testify so that the court was not required to, consider the question of whether
the prosecution was attempting to circumvent the right of confrontation by
including "expected" testimony in an opening statement.
56. 89 S.Ct. at 1423.
57. 89 S.Ct. 540 (1969).
58. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
59. The Court will only apply retroactively those decisions dealing with
violations and abuses of one's constitutional rights where the violation detracts
from the "integrity of the fact-finding process."
(Vol. 21
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testimony of an absent witness, which was taken at the pre-
liminary hearing. The Court held such testimony to be inad-
missible unless the State could show that it had made a bona
fide effort to secure the witness' presence. In Berger the State
had contacted the witness about the impending trial but had
failed to subpoena him.
IX. SNTNNCING
While the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment has not been made applicable to the states,
the Supreme Court has influenced state sentencing procedures by
finding certain procedures violative of other basic constitutional
protections. In North Carolinav '. Pearce,60 supra, the Court con-
fronted the issue of whether the defendant's rights under due
process were violated where, after gaining a new trial, he was
given a harsher sentence upon a second conviction. While
recognizing that there is no absolute constitutional bar to such
a practice, the Court saw in this procedure the danger that the
defendant might be penalized for successfully overturning his
conviction on a procedural technicality. The Court held that a
more severe sentence may not be imposed to punish or deter
those who choose to avail themselves of their right to appeal;
such a practice violates due process of law. In order to insure
that the desire to penalize or deter is not the motivating factor
behind the imposition of a harsher sentence, the Court ruled
that the trial record must affirmatively show the trial judge's
reasons for imposing a heavier sentence and that his reasons
must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable
conduct of the defendant subsequent to his original conviction.
The South Carolina Constitution embodies terms prohibiting
cruel or unusual punishment identical to those found in the
eighth amendment. 61 The issue usually originates where the
defendant claims that his sentence or fine is excessive. Only in
rare instances will the supreme court find that a sentence is
excessive when it is within the statutory limits.62
In State v. Sanders68 the defendant was given the maximum
sentence for the convicted offense without being given credit for
the ten months spent in jail awaiting trial. In denying the
claim that the sentence was excessive, the court pointed out that
60. 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969).
61. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
62. But see State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948).
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it was within the statutory bounds and there was no evidence
that the imposition of the sentence was motivated by any corrupt
motive; in view of the defendant's prior criminal record, the
imposition of the maximum sentence was not an abuse of dis-
cretion.
The court also rejected the defendant's contention that his
sentence was excessive because he received the maximum sentence
for the crime and yet he was not credited with the ten months
spent in jail awaiting trial. Giving such credit is exclusively
within the discretion of the trial judge. In no event could the
defendant claim that credit must be given as a matter of right,
for "presentence time was no part of the punishment imposed"
and thus it may not be considered in assessing whether a sentence
is "cruel or unusual."0 4
X. LmisxLrmow
Since Gideon v. TVainwigtd65 made it mandatory for the
states to provide indigent defendants with counsel in all "serious"
cases, non-capital as well as capital, South Carolina in recogniz-
ing its obligations under this decision has appointed counsel for
indigent defendants in a manner which has often proved un-
satisfactory to both the lawyer and the defendant. Upon the
determination that a defendant was indigent, counsel was ap-
pointed to defend him without pay. Usually counsel was ap-
pointed only a day or two before trial, a fact which often made
adequate representation impossible. Discontent with this system
was reflected in a variety of ways. Criminal defendants fre-
quently claimed that they were the victims of inadequate repre-
sentation, claims which the South Carolina courts uniformly
rejected. The attitude of the courts and the bar was often
expressed by a resentment that an able-bodied defendant was
unable to secure funds to pay a lawyer.
66
64. Id. at 446, 163 S.F_2d at 228. Quaere: Might not North Carolina v.
Pearce affect the validity of this decision? In Sanders the defendant, while
sentenced for a period within the statutory limit, was actually incarcerated
for a period in excess of that limit. While the Pearce Court faced a different
factual situation, the rationale behind the decision could cover the situation
presented in Sanders. Since Sanders was actually incarcerated for a period
longer that the statutory maximum, the double jeopardy approach in Pearce
may be applicable.
65. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
66. In State v. Cowart, 251 S.C. 360, 162 S.E.2d 535 (1968), the trial
judge upon learning of two able-bodied defendants' indigency postponed their
trial until a later term of court so that they might secure funds to pay a
lawyer; upon their failure to do so, he proceeded with their trial without
appointing counsel. Their conviction was, of course, overturned on appeal,
but this incident well reflects the discontent with the existing system.
[Vol. 21
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In 1969 the South Carolina legislature sought to remedy this
situation by enacting An Act to Provide for the Defense of
Indigents Charged with a CriWe.67 The act explicitly recognizes
the state's obligation to provide counsel for truly indigent de-
fendants. To determine the defendant's indigency, the act re-
quires that he set forth all of his assets in an affidavit; if he has
some assets but not enough to retain counsel, he may be required
to pay such assets to the State Treasurer. The appointment of
counsel creates a claim against his estate and assets equal to the
cost of representation; the court may elect to reduce this claim
to a judgment against the defendant's properties.
The act provides for two methods of providing counsel to
indigent defendants. Under section four counsel may be ap-
pointed much in the same fashion as before the enactment of this
bill. Counsel will be paid ten dollars per hour for time spent
out of court and fifteen dollars per hour for time spent in court,
with the total not to exceed five hundred dollars in a non-capital
case and seven hundred fifty dollars in a capital case. The same
hourly rates are applicable to post-conviction proceedings with
the total for such proceedings not to exceed five hundred dollars.
As an alternative to the system outlined above, section five
provides that the bar of each county may choose to establish a
public defender system. To finance such a system, the state will
provide one hundred fifty dollars for each one thousand persons
within the county. Counties electing to have a public defender
system may have one or more public defenders as deemed neces-
sary by the county bar. Each public defender will receive a
salary not to exceed that of the solicitor of his judicial circuit;
the assistant public defenders will receive a salary not to exceed
that of the assistant solicitors.
In addition, the state will provide a fund of fifty thousand
dollars annually to reimburse appointed counsel, public defend-
ers, and assistant public defenders for necessary expenses in-
curred in the representation of indigent defendants, as long as
the expenses are approved by the trial judge.
While both of these procedures will undoubtedly prove to be
more satisfactory than the system employed before enactment of
this bill, it is likely that the best results will be achieved by the
establishment of public defender systems. Such systems will
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provide a nucleus of counsel experienced and trained in criminal
defense. The creation of such systems will also have the probable
result that a lawyer will enter the case at an earlier stage in the
proceedings than is the practice now. One weakness of the bill
is that it makes no mention of when the defendant's right to
appointed counsel attaches and presumably the former practice
of appointing counsel within the week of the defendant's trial
would continue in those counties adopting the procedure outlined
in section four of the act.68
XI. BArt
Historically bail has been a device intended to combine the
administration of justice with the freedom and convenience of
the accused. While seeking to insure the presence of the accused
at trial, it also implicitly recognizes that a person should not be
incarcerated before he has been legally convicted, for such in-
carceration may function to punish innocent persons and cer-
tainly detracts from the accused's ability to prepare his defense. 9
In Anglo-American jurisdictions money bail is the standard
practice, and all too often bail is set according to an arbitrary
schedule which has no real relationship to the true purpose of
bail.
Recoginizing the weaknesses inherent in a money bail system,
South Carolina adopted a potentially far-reaching act"° which
could conform the bail institution to its actual purposes- in-
suring the defendant's presence at trial and protecting the com-
munity from unreasonable danger, while simultaneously allowing
the accused to be at liberty before he is legally convicted.
The act provides that any person charged with a non-capital
offense shall be ordered released pending trial on his own
recognizance in an amount specified by the court without surety,
unless the court determines that such a release will not adequately
insure the defendant's presence at trial or that it will create an
unreasonable danger to the community. If the court makes such
68. Under present South Carolina practice the defendant is not entitled to
have counsel before his trial as long as he is not interrogated or placed in a
line-up. He may complain of the delay in appointing counsel only if he can
show that he was unable to adequately prepare his case because he was in jail
without the benefit of counsel to obtain evidence and interview witnesses. See
State v. Sanders, 251 S.C. 431, 163 S.E.2d 220 (1968).
69. 8 C.J.S. Bail § 31 (1962).
70. R458, June 18, 1969.
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss4/5
CRIMNAL PROCEDUiE SUnVED
a determination, 71 it may impose any one or more of the follow-
ing conditions of release: (a) require the execution of an appear-
ance bond in a specified amount with adequate surety approved
by the court; (b) place the accused in the custody of a designated
person or organization which will agree to supervise him; (c)
place restrictions on travel, association, or residence of the
accused during the period of pre-trial release; or (d) impose any
other condition deemed necessary to assure appearance, including
a requirement that the accused return to custody at a specified
hour. The act is given real teeth by subjecting a defendant who
wilfully fails to appear before the court as required to criminal
prosecution as well as to forfeiture of any security that he may
have posted.
XII. PosT-CoNvIwCoN REMEDIEs
In criminal law administration it has long been recognized
that the area of post-conviction procedure has been beset by in-
adequacies and confusion resulting from a plethora of remedies,
both state and federal, which are inconsistent and indefinite in
their application and encourage a deluge of groundless applica-
tions for relief, usually in the form of petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. A collateral effect of these inadequacies has been
long years of illegal confinement for those who have legitmate
claims but who are unable to obtain an expeditious hearing. It
was to rectify this situation that the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act in 1955. The purpose of this
act was to provide a single remedy which would supersede and
include all other common law and statutory remedies such as
habeas corpus and coram nobis. In 1969 South Carolina adopted
this act.
72
The remedy provided by this act is available to anyone con-
victed of, or sentenced for, a crime, who claims that: (1) the
conviction or sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution or laws of South Carolina; (2)
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; (3)
71. It is hoped that magistrates will conduct some type of bail hearing in
order to make such determinations. To determine what conditions of release
will reasonably assure appearance or what release would unreasonably endanger
the community, the court should consider the nature and circumstances of the
offense charged, the accused's family ties, employment, financial resources,
character and mental condition, roots in the community, prior convictions,
and previous record of violating bail bonds.
72. R244, May 1, 1969. The form for proceeding under the act was
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that the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; (4)
that there existed evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard, which would require vacation of the con-
viction or sentence in the interest of justice; (5) that the sen-
tence has expired, that probation, parole, or conditional release
has been unlawfully revoked, or that he is otherwise unlawfully
detained; or (6) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise sub-
ject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error here-
tofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ,
motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy. This remedy is not
available, however, to attack a conviction on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.
The remedy provided in this act does not substitute for or
affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court,
nor does it affect direct review of the sentence or conviction.
It is designed to comprehend and take the place of all other
common law or statutory remedies available for challenging the
validity of the conviction or the sentence; indeed, it is to be used
exclusively in place of such remedies."
A proceeding is commenced by filing an application with the
clerk of the court in which the conviction took place. This pro-
vision will greatly reduce the burden of the Richland County
courts where most petitions for writs of habeas corpus have been
entertained; it will reduce the cost of such proceedings since
most of the necessary witnesses will be residents of the locality
in which the conviction occurred; and it will provide a more
meaningful hearing since the trial court is likely to be more
familiar with the background and facts of the case.
In his application for relief the defendant must set forth
specifically the relief he seeks and the grounds on which he feels
entitled to relief. All grounds for relief available to an appli-
cant must be set forth in his pleadings. Any basis for relief
which has been finally adjudicated or which has not been raised
in his application may not be raised in a subsequent application
unless the court finds that the asserted grounds could not have
been raised in the original application. The obvious consequence
of this provision is to require the defendant to present all of
his claims in a single hearing rather than to allow him to besiege
the courts with an endless procession of petitions for writs of
habeas corpus.
73. This provision does not "suspend" the writ of habeas corpus; it offers a
remedy encompassing that which the writ of habeas corpus formerly provided.
[Vol. 21
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The proceedings under this act are quite similar to those in
civil proceedings. Within thirty days after the docketing of the
defendant's application, the State must respond by answer or
motion. Both the defendant and the State may present affidavits
in support of their pleadings. The court at any time before entry
of judgment may issue orders for amendment of the pleadings,
or it may require either party to plead over again. In consider-
ing the defendant's application, the court is to be more concerned
with its substance than with its form. Where the court is satis-
fied that the defendant's application has no merit, it may indi-
cate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application; the
defendant may then be given an opportunity to reply to the
proposed dismissal and the court may allow him to amend his
pleadings. Similarly the court may grant either party's motion
for summary judgment when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and agreements of fact that there is no
real issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
The hearing to determine the validity of the defendant's claim
is designed to provide a speedy and just resolution of the dispute.
All rules and statutes applicable to civil proceedings are avail-
able to either party, and the court may receive proofs by affi-
davits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence, and if the
need arises it may order the defendant to be brought before the
court. These provisions are intended to procure a rapid disposal
of applications for relief, and for those without merit the de-
fendant will not be permitted to leave the penitentiary. The
court is given broad powers to dispose of the application. If it
finds in favor of the defendant it is to enter an appropriate
order with respect to the conviction or sentence and any supple-
mental order as to retrial, custody, bail, discharge, or modifica-
tion of sentence. Thus, an error in the trial need not necessarily
effect the release of a guilty party.
The court's order is to be a final judgment from which either
party may appeal to the supreme court. Since the defendant will
often seek relief in the federal courts after denial of relief under
the provisions of this act, the court is required to make specific
findings of fact as to each issue presented. This is done in order
to assist a federal court in determining whether a federal ques-
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